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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellate iuri •.••.!••• . <•.<-; i.s nested in ""he Utah 
Coi irt of Appeals pursuant to Section 7 8-2a-3 (2) (f) , Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE _A_ SUFFICIENT L,\ .DEN "E PRODUCFA A, i M / i L 
TO SUProh : VENN": k; CONVICT JONS FOR 
CARRYING A CONCEALED r - 7 
POSSESSION 0 r 'nmra PM RAPHE!"'- • ' . -
St d Li d a J 11 «i Review 
When reviewing the findi ngs of a trial ji idge sitting withoi it 
a jury, ar I appellate coi irt will overturn a guilty verdict only if 
the verdict is clearly erroneous. State v, Taylor, 81 8 P.2d 1030 
(Utah 1991). Al so, iho Uhth Supreme Court has stated: 
When challenging the findings of fact of the 
trial court on appeal, the appellant must show 
that the findings of fact were clearly 
erroneous. In order to show clear error, the 
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings of fact 
and then demonstrate that the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom, is insufficient to support the 
findings against an attack. 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-6 (Utah 1990) (footnotes 
omitted). 
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ISSUE 2: DOES DENNIES HAVE STANDING TO CHALLENGE 
THE SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE USED AGAINST HIM 
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY SEARCH 
OF THE VEHICLE? 
Standard of Review. 
The factual findings underlying the trial court's decision 
should be reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. The trial 
court's conclusions of law based on those facts are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, "Unlawful acts": 
See Exhibit A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504, "Carrying concealed dangerous 
weapon": 
See Exhibit B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for violations 
of Section 76-10-504, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
"Carrying concealed dangerous weapon," and Section 58-37a-5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, "Unlawful acts" related to drug 
paraphernalia, i.e., possession of drug paraphernalia, both of 
which are class B misdemeanors. 
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COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Prosecution In this rase war, * u >ntmt man I v illi ! he arrest of 
< . . Dennies on April 8, 199 5, A bench trial was held bet ore 
the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring in Ttlirci - >.. . ; ! ey 
D e p a i ! mont , « "M J u n e ]'», 1 99 5, 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
At trial, Denni es was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. On July J. 1, 1995, Dennies 
was sentenced to pay a fine and seive n jaiJ form, The court 
suspended a substantial portion of both the fine and jail term and 
placed Dennies on probation foi twelve month:!. Dei n lies filed a 
Not ice ui Appeal in this case on June 27, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On April 8, 1995, at approximately 3:30 a.m., Officer 
Hudson of the West Valley City Police Department stopped a vehicle 
in the vicinity of 4100 South 4000 West. Officer Hudson had 
observed that the vehicle had no taillights or brake lights. 
R. 31, 37.x 
2. The vehicle contained three occupants. Denni€?s was a 
passenger in the vehicle, and, at the ti me of the traffic stop, 
Officer Iludson observed that Dennies was sitting in the front 
passenger seat. R. 32-33, 40. 
"R" refers to the Record as paginated by the trial court 
clerk in accordance with Rule 11(b), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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3. Upon investigation, Officer Hudson determined that none 
of the three occupants of the vehicle possessed a valid driver's 
license. R. 33, 37. He further testified that the driver of the 
vehicle said he did not know where the owner of the vehicle was. 
R. 37. Based upon that information, Officer Hudson had the vehicle 
impounded. R. 33. 
4. At the time of the traffic stop, Officer Hudson did not 
observe a weapon inside the vehicle. R. 39. 
5. Before the vehicle was towed to the impounded lot, 
Officer Gray of the West Valley City Police Department performed an 
inventory search of the vehicle. R. 42. 
6. During the inventory search of the vehicle, Officer Gray 
found a knife, with a blade approximately six inches long, between 
the passenger seat and center console of the vehicle. R. 43. In 
this type of vehicle, a GMC Jimmy, a center console is located 
between the driver's seat and passenger's seat. R. 38. 
7. During the inventory search of the vehicle, Officer Gray 
found, and both Officer Gray and Officer Hudson observed, a spoon 
lying on the floorboard of the vehicle in front of the passenger 
seat in which Dennies had been sitting. R. 39, 43. Officer Hudson 
testified that the spoon was of a type commonly used to ingest 
controlled substances, and that the spoon had a powder residue on 
it. R. 36. Officer Gray testified that he also observed a powder 
residue on the spoon, and, based upon his experience, that the 
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powder residue and scratches on the spoon indicated drug usage. 
R. 43, 47. 
8. Officers Hudson and Gray also found numerous syringes in 
the vehicle. R. 38, 44. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY 
VERDICT ON THE CHARGES OF CARRYING A 
CONCEALED WEAPON AND POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA. 
The Record reveals that there was adequate evidence produced 
at trial to support Dennies' conviction on the charges of Carrying 
a Concealed Weapon and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. The 
testimony of the police officers established that the knife, which 
was found tucked between the side of the passenger seat and the 
center console of the vehicle, was concealed. Also, it is clear 
from the testimony that the weapon was within the control and the 
easy, immediate, and ready access of Dennies, who was seated in the 
passenger seat. 
With respect to the drug paraphernalia, the officers testified 
that they recognized the dry powder residue and scratches on the 
spoon as being consistent with the use of the spoon in connection 
with the use of controlled substances. They also testified that 
the spoon was found on the floorboard of the vehicle in front of 
the passenger seat, a location clearly under the control of 
Dennies, who was seated in the passenger seat. 
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POINT 2: DENNIES HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE USED AGAINST HIM 
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY SEARCH 
OF THE VEHICLE. ALSO, THE STOP, IMPOUND, 
AND SUBSEQUENT INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE 
VEHICLE WERE VALID. 
Dennies was a passenger in the vehicle and asserted no 
possessory interest in either the vehicle, the knife, or the spoon. 
Because he did not demonstrate any interest in the property seized 
or an expectation of privacy in the place searched, he has no 
standing to contest the validity of the search. 
Furthermore, the testimony at trial established that the stop, 
impound, and inventory search of the vehicle were valid. First, 
the stop was based upon the officer's observation that the vehicle 
had no taillights or brake lights. The impound of the vehicle was 
proper, since no one in the vehicle had a valid driver's license, 
and the driver told the officer that he did not know where the 
owner was. Finally, the inventory search was valid as a well 
settled exception to the normal warrant requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 : THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE TRIAL COURT 
WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A GUILTY 
VERDICT ON THE CHARGES OF CARRYING A 
CONCEALED WEAPON AND POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA. 
A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
case is governed by a clear and unambiguous standard. The Utah 
Supreme Court has articulated that standard as follows: 
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When reviewing the findings of a trial judge 
sitting without a jury, this court will 
overturn a guilty verdict only if it is 
clearly erroneous. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-93 (Utah 1987). 
The Supreme Court has defined the "clearly erroneous" standard 
as follows: 
The definition of "clearly erroneous" in the 
federal rule comes from United States v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 
68 S. Ct. 525, 542, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948): 
A finding is "clearly erroneous" when 
although there is evidence to support it, 
the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed. 
Further clarification is offered by Wright & 
Miller: 
The appellate court . . . does not 
consider and weigh the evidence de novo. 
The mere fact that on the same evidence 
the appellate court might have reached a 
different result does not justify it in 
setting the findings aside. It may 
regard a finding as clearly erroneous 
only if the finding is without adequate 
evidentiary support or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
Finally, the Utah Court of Appeals followed the guidance of 
the Utah Supreme Court by stating: 
In considering the challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we review the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
verdict . . . . If, during our review, we 
find some evidence or inferences upon which 
7 
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findings of all the requisite elements of the 
crime can reasonably be made, we affirm. 
State v. Perry, 871 P.2d 576, (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Gezmonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993); citation omitted). 
In this case, sufficient evidence was presented to the trial 
court to support a verdict of guilty on both the Carrying a 
Concealed Weapon charge and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia 
charge. When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Dennies 
has the burden of marshaling all of the evidence that supports the 
verdict and then showing that even when that evidence is viewed in 
a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient. State v. Hayes, 860 P.2d 968 (Utah App. 1993). 
Dennies simply has provided the court with a recitation of the 
facts that support his position and, thus, has failed to meet the 
"marshaling" burden. 
The facts presented to the trial court, which support the 
verdicts, are as follows. 
Concealed Weapon 
In order to prove a violation of Section 76-10-504, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, "Carrying concealed dangerous weapon," 
the evidence must support a conclusion that the dangerous weapon 
was "concealed" and also that Dennies was "carrying" the weapon. 
The Record of the trial indicates that evidence supporting those 
conclusions was presented to the trial court. 
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First, Officer Hudson testified that he made the initial 
traffic stop. At the time of the stop, Dennies was seated in the 
front passenger seat of the vehicle. R. 33. Officer Hudson 
testified that he approached the driver of the vehicle and asked 
for a driver's license. R. 32. Despite this relatively close 
contact with the vehicle and Dennies, Officer Hudson was not aware 
of the presence of the knife until it was later discovered during 
the inventory search conducted by Officer Gray. R. 34-35. 
Officer Gray testified that while conducting an inventory 
search subsequent to impound of the vehicle, he located the knife 
between the front passenger seat and the center console of the 
vehicle. R. 43. The knife was discovered after Dennies had exited 
the vehicle and no one was sitting in the front passenger seat. 
Officer Gray testified that he was kneeling inside the vehicle, on 
the passenger side, when he first noticed the handle of the knife. 
R. 45. He further testified that based solely on the visibility of 
the handle, he thought the object might be a knife, but could not 
be sure. R. 45-46. Upon retrieving the knife, Officer Gray found 
the blade to be approximately six inches long. R. 43. 
Based upon these facts and the reasonable inferences 
therefrom, the trial court concluded that the placement of the 
knife met the objective standard of concealment. 
Based upon the same facts, Dennies was also correctly 
considered to be "carrying" the weapon. Utah case law is clear 
that a person does not have to have a weapon on his body in order 
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to be considered to be "carrying" the weapon. The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated: 
To rule that the weapon must be on the person 
would make possible the carrying of a deadly 
weapon concealed on the seat of an automobile, 
where it would be more readily accessible than 
it would be if concealed on the person. No 
such result is contemplated or permitted by 
the statute. 
State v. Williams, 636 P.2d 1092, 1095 (1981). The Williams court 
also stated: 
As a factual matter, where the concealed 
weapon is shown to be under defendant's 
control and within his immediate, easy or 
ready access, he will be deemed to be 
"carrying" the weapon. 
Williams, at 1094. 
In this case, there can be no doubt that the knife was located 
within Dennies' immediate, easy, or ready access, since he was 
seated in the passenger seat, and the knife was tucked between that 
seat and the center console. Also, the clear inference from the 
facts presented at trial is that Dennies was the individual in 
control of the weapon. Based on the location in which the weapon 
was found, i.e., tucked down the side of Dennies' seat, he was the 
person in the vehicle who had the ability to quickly access and use 
the weapon. In fact, it can be inferred, based upon a normal 
configuration of vehicle seats and consoles, that the weapon was in 
a position where Dennies may have been in actual physical contact 
with the weapon at times. Also, the only other person seated in 
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the front of the vehicle, driver Terry Burgess, specifically denied 
any knowledge of the knife. R. 53. 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was adequate 
evidence presented to the trial court to support the conviction of 
Dennies. 
Possession of Drucr Paraphernalia 
In order to find a violation of Section 58-37a-5, Utah Code 
Annotated 19 53, as amended, "Unlawful acts" related to drug 
paraphernalia, the court must find that the spoon constituted drug 
paraphernalia and that Dennies possessed the spoon with intent to 
use a controlled substance. In this case, the evidence is more 
than adequate to support the trial court's conviction of Dennies. 
Officer Hudson and Officer Gray both testified that the spoon 
was covered with a dry powder residue. R. 36, 43. Officer Hudson 
testified that the spoon was of a type commonly used to ingest 
controlled substances. R. 36. In describing the spoon, Officer 
Gray testified that, "Based on my prior experience and training as 
a police officer, I would judge that to be powder residue and 
scrapes and marks from use of controlled substances." R. 47. 
Officer Gray also testified that during the inventory search, he 
located numerous syringes in the vehicle. R. 44. 
Based on the observations of experienced police officers and 
the fact that the spoon was found in close proximity to other drug 
paraphernalia, i.e., the syringes, the trial court correctly 
determined the spoon to be drug paraphernalia. 
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Dennies' possession of the spoon is based upon a theory of 
constructive possession. The Court of Appeals has stated: 
It is well settled that the contraband need 
only be shown to have been subject to the 
dominion and control of the accused or, in 
other words, within the accused's constructive 
possession. 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991). 
Both Officer Hudson and Officer Gray testified that the spoon was 
found in plain sight on the floorboard in front of the front 
passenger seat of the vehicle. This is the exact location where 
Dennies was sitting at the time of the traffic stop and is clearly 
an area of the vehicle that was solely under the control of 
Dennies. It would be difficult for any other occupant of the 
vehicle to access this area without Dennies' exiting the vehicle, 
unless they virtually climbed over Dennies. 
It is a fair inference, based upon the location of the spoon, 
that the spoon was solely in the possession of Dennies. The only 
testimony regarding ownership of the spoon was provided by 
Bryan Frew, the owner of the vehicle. Mr. Frew was not present at 
the time the vehicle was stopped, but testified that a friend of 
his had eaten a steak and some ice cream in the vehicle sometime 
prior to April 8, 1995, and had left the knife and spoon in the 
vehicle. R. 57. The trial court specifically stated that it found 
no credibility in Mr. Frew's testimony. R. 69. 
Dennies' reliance upon the Salas case is misplaced. Salas is 
a case that has significantly different facts than this case. A 
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comparison of the Salas facts with the facts of this case lend 
support to the trial court's decision to find constructive 
possession by Dennies. 
In the Salas case, the defendant was the driver of the 
vehicle. After being stopped by police, who conducted a search of 
the vehicle, drugs were found under a back seat where a passenger 
had been sitting. Salas was charged with possession of cocaine 
based solely on his ownership of the vehicle. The Court, in Salas, 
found that there was insufficient evidence that Salas was in 
possession of drugs. The Court found the following facts 
important: "One passenger had better access to the spot where 
cocaine was found than did defendant." Salas, at 1389. Also, "The 
drug itself was found in an area that was not easily accessible to 
the defendant. There had been a backseat passenger close to where 
the drug was found . . . ." Salas, at 1389. In the Salas case, 
defendant Salas' only connection with the drugs was his ownership 
of the vehicle. The facts lacking in Salas that caused the Court 
to find insufficient evidence of ownership are not lacking in this 
case . 
In this case, the drug paraphernalia was found lying right at 
the feet of Dennies. Unlike Salas, Dennies did have sole access to 
the area of the vehicle in which the spoon was found. No other 
passengers in the vehicle had better access to the spoon than did 
Dennies, and, in fact, the spoon was found in an area that was not 
easily accessible to other passengers. These additional facts 
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distinguish this case from the Salas decision and support the 
conclusions of the trial court. 
Based upon the foregoing, there is sufficient evidence in the 
Record that supports the trial court's verdict of guilty on the 
charge of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
POINT 2: DENNIES HAS NO STANDING TO CHALLENGE THE 
SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE USED AGAINST HIM 
DURING THE IMPOUND AND INVENTORY SEARCH 
OF THE VEHICLE. ALSO, THE STOP, IMPOUND, 
AND SUBSEQUENT INVENTORY SEARCH OF THE 
VEHICLE WERE VALID. 
Dennies has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of 
the search, since he was only a passenger in the vehicle. This 
issue has been addressed by both the United States Supreme Court in 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128; 58 L. Ed. 2d, 387; 99 S. Ct. 421 
(1978), and the Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Scott, 860 P.2d 
1005 (Utah App. 1993). In both cases, the defendants sought to 
suppress evidence found in vehicles in which they were passengers. 
The law in both cases states that in order to challenge the 
propriety of a search, a defendant must first establish a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place being searched, and, 
also, that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature and may 
not be vicariously asserted. Scott, at 1007. 
In relying upon the Rakas decision, the Utah Court of" Appeals 
stated: 
Where a defendant asserts neither a property 
nor a possessory interest in the automobile, 
nor an interest in the property seized, he has 
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not demonstrated an expectation of privacy and 
thus has no standing to challenge the search. 
Scott, at 1007 . 
The situation described by the Scott court is identical to the 
situation presented here. Dennies specifically disavowed any 
possessory interest in the drug paraphernalia spoon or the 
concealed knife. R. 59. Also, Dennies presented evidence from 
Mr. Frew that Mr. Frew was the owner of the vehicle. R. 56. 
Dennies asserted absolutely no property or possessory interest in 
the vehicle, the spoon, or the knife, and he therefore has no 
standing to challenge the search. 
The Court in Scott also addressed the potential defense 
argument that since the City claims the items seized belong to 
Dennies, the City cannot argue otherwise with respect to the 
search. The Court stated: 
Such an argument is not sufficient to meet 
defendant's burden; defendant bears the burden 
of proving his standing. Such proof is not 
made by pointing to an allegation made by the 
State, especially where, as here, that 
allegation is denied by defendant. 
Scott, at 1008 (emphasis in original; citation omitted). 
Even if Dennies was found to have standing, the stop, impound, 
and subsequent inventory search were valid exercises of police 
power. First, Officer Hudson testified that he initially stopped 
the vehicle because it had no taillights or brake lights. R. 31. 
Vehicle stops incident to traffic violations committed in an 
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officer's presence are clearly legal under Utah law. State v. 
Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1990). 
Officer Hudson testified that once the vehicle had been 
stopped, no one in the vehicle could produce a valid driver's 
license, and the driver of the vehicle, Terry Burgess, said he did 
not know where the owner of the vehicle was. R. 33, 37. Officer 
Hudson further testified that given the situation, "By policy, 
we're required to generally impound the vehicle." R. 37. Based 
upon this evidence, there is no indication that the impound of the 
vehicle was in bad faith or in any way out of keeping with normal 
police department procedures. 
Finally, the law is also well settled that inventory searches 
of automobiles are an exception to the normal warrant requirements 
of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217 (Utah App. 1993). 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that Dennies has no 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the inventory search 
conducted on the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Furthermore, 
the evidence demonstrates that the vehicle stop, impound, and 
subsequent inventory search were conducted in a proper manner in 
conformance with existing law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that sufficient evidence 
was produced at trial to support the conviction of Dennies for 
Carrying a Concealed Weapon and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
Also, Dennies has no standing to challenge the valid vehicle stop, 
impound, and inventory search. Finally, Dennies has failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the verdict against him and then to 
demonstrate that the verdict was without any basis. Dennies' 
argument is based only on his interpretation of the evidence, which 
is not the only reasonable interpretation. Contradictory versions 
of the facts, without more, is not a ground for reversal. State v. 
Davis, 111 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985). 
The City respectfully requests that Dennies' appeal be denied, 
and that the conviction of the trial court be affirmed. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 199 5. 
WEST VALLEY CITY 
J.\^ichard Catten, Senior Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A: Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, 
"Unlawful acts" 
Exhibit B: Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-504, 
"Carrying concealed dangerous weapon" 
Exhibit A 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor 
Exhibit B 
76-10-504. Carrying concealed dangerous weapon. 
(1) Any person, except those persons described in Section 76-10-503 and 
those persons exempted under Section 76-10-510, carrying a concealed dan-
gerous weapon, as defined in this Part 5, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
except that a firearm that contains no ammunition and is enclosed in a case, 
gun box, or securely-tied package shall not be considered a concealed weapon, 
but 
(a) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains no ammunition, 
he shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor, 
(b) If the dangerous weapon is a firearm and contains ammunition, he 
shall be guilty of a class A misdemeanor, or 
(c) If the dangerous weapon is a sawed-off shotgun, or if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm and is used to commit a crime of violence, he shall be 
guilty of a felony of the third degree 
(2) Nothing in this Part 5 shall prevent any person, except persons de-
scribed in Section 76-10-503, from keeping within his place of residence, place 
of business, or any vehicle under his control any firearm, except that it shall be 
a class B misdemeanor to carry a loaded firearm in a vehicle 
